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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-CALIFoRNIA's QUASI-COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LEGISLATION, WHICH SUBJECTS MARITAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY A SPOUSE WHILE DOMICILED IN ANOTHER STATE
TO DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO THE DISCRETION OF THE
TRIAL COURT UPON A DIVORCE DECREE, HELD CONSTITU-
TIONAL. Addison v. Addison (Cal. 1965).
In a divorce action on the ground of adultery, the plaintiff wife
contended that all property located in California in the name of the
husband was derived from personal property acquired while residing
in a common law state and that it should be regarded as quasi-com-
munity property as defined in Civil Code section 140.5.' The wife
asked for distribution of the property in accordance with Civil Code
section 146(a),2 which is applicable when divorces are granted on
the grounds of adultery, incurable insanity, or extreme cruelty and
which provides that the community propertys and quasi-community
1 "As used in Sections 140.7 [separate property does not include quasi-community
property], 141 [enforcement of decree, etc., against property: resort to community prop-
erty, quasi-community property then separate property], 142 [withholding of allowance
to prevailing party: when allowance not to be made from separate estate of other party],
143 [community, quasi-community and separate property may be subjected to support
and education of children], 146 [infra note 2], 148 [disposition of property subject to
revision on appeal], 149 [jurisdiction of court over community and quasi-community
real property of spouse served by summons] and 176 [when wife must support hus-
band] of this code 'quasi-community property' means all personal property wherever
situated and all real property situated in this State heretofore or hereafter acquired:
(a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been community
property of the husband and wife had the spouse acquiring the property been domiciled
in this State at the time of acquisition; or (b) In exchange for real or personal prop-
erty, wherever situated, acquired other than by gift, devise, bequest or descent by either
spouse during the marriage while domiciled elsewhere. For the purposes of this section,
personal property does not include and real property does include leasehold interests
in real property." CAL. CIrv. CODE § 140.5. Statutory quasi-community property is thus
distinguishable from the equitable doctrine of quasi-community property which extends
to putative spouses the benefits of the community property system and is analogous to
it. The leading case establishing the equitable quasi-community property doctrine in
California is Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441 (1911).
2 "In case of the dissolution of the marriage by decree of a court of competent juris-
diction or in the case of judgement or decree for separate maintenance of the husband
or the wife without dissolution of the marriage, the court shall make an order for dis-
position of the community property and the quasi-community property and for the as-
signment of the homestead as follows: (a) If the decree is rendered on the ground of
adultery, incurable insanity or extreme cruelty, the community property and quasi-
community property shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as
the court, from all the facts of the case, and the condition of the parties, may deem
just. (b) If the decree be rendered on any other ground than that of adultery, incurable
insanity or extreme cruelty, the community property and quasi-community property shall
be equally divided between the parties .. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 146.
3 "Community property is property acquired by husband and wife, or either, during
marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either." CAL. CIV. CODE § 687.
"[A]ll property not held as community property must, for the want of a better name,
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property in such cases shall be assigned to the respective parties in
such proportions as the court may deem just. The trial court held,
inter alia, that the quasi-community property legislation was uncon-
stitutional. The district court of appeal affirmed on the ground that
Estate of Thornton4 was controlling but suggested that "it may be
that a reconsideration of the governing principles of constitutional
law would lead to a qualification of the reasoning exemplified in the
Thornton case so as to sustain the legislative concept of quasi-com-
munity property with respect to the determination of property rights
in the event of divorce." 5 However, the court stated that any such
reconsideration should be undertaken by the California Supreme
Court.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case. The court determined that: (1) the Thornton decision was
not controlling; (2) the husband was not deprived of a vested right
without due process of law; (3) the husband's rights under the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution were not abridged; (4) the quasi-
community property legislation was not violative of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States
Constitution; (5) the legislation was being applied prospectively in
this case; and (6) the contention that the legislation was not ap-
plicable to this case because it was enacted subsequent to the filing
of the divorce action was untenable. The court held that the Cali-
fornia quasi-community property legislation is constitutional by
virtue of the state's legitimate concern regarding the property
interests of married persons domiciled within the state upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d
897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1965).
The Thornton case, relied upon by the husband in Addison, in-
volved a widow who sought to establish community property rights
in the estate of her husband by application of Civil Code section 1640
be classed as separate property." Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 770, 7 P.2d 1003,
1004 (1932).
4 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
5 Addison v. Addison, 40 Cal. Rptr. 330, 333 (1964), vacated, Addison v. Addison,
62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 164, before being amended in 1961, included the following: "All
other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, including
real property located in this State and personal property wherever situated, heretofore
or hereafter acquired while domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate
property of either if acquired while domiciled in this State, is community property
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as amended in 1923. The husband's estate consisted of property
which had been acquired for the most part during their former
domicile in Montana. The Thornton court held Civil Code section
164 unconstitutional on the grounds that the husband had obtained
vested rights in the property which could not constitutionally be
altered without violation of the privileges and immunities accorded
to him and ".. . to take the property of A and transfer it to B because
of his citizenship and domicile, is also to take his property without
due process of law. This is true regardless of the place of acquisition
or the state of his residence."7
The Thornton court relied upon Spreckles v. Spreckles,8 which
established by a concession of counsel that legislation changing the
community property system could not constitutionally be applied
retroactively to affect vested property interests and must be limited
to prospective application. The Spreckles rule is an expression of
the fundamental rule of property law that the character of property
is determined by its status at the time of acquisition.' Hence, any
subsequent legislation that varies the character of the property, i.e.,
diminishes the interest of the owner therein, is considered to be
"retroactive," and unconstitutional unless limited to act only on
property interests acquired after enactment of the legislation. It was
pointed out by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in Boyd v.
Oser10 that this "rule of property" protecting vested property
7 1 Cal. 2d at 5, 33 P.2d at 3, 92 A.L.R. 1343. Thornton held section 146 uncon-
stitutional insofar as the amendment attempted to affect personal property brought to
-California which was the separate property of one of the spouses while domiciled out-
side this state. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 563, 399 P.2d at 900, 43 Cal. Rptr.
at 100, states that the amendment's effect upon real property had never been tested
before it was repealed in 1961. California courts have uniformly held that the removal
of acquired wealth from one state to another does not change the classification of the
property from separate to community or from community to separate property. Rozan
v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322. 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
3, 314 P.2d 10 (1957); Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944);
Estate of Warner, 167 Cal. 686, 140 Pac. 583 (1914) ; Estate of Burrows, 136 Cal. 113,
68 Pac. 488 (1902); Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877); VERRAL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 4 (1960); Leflar, Community
Property and Conflict of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. Rv. 221 (1933).
8 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). "[Clounsel admit that if the husband is the
.owner of the property, then a statute which makes the exercise of the right to dispose
-of it subject to the will of another is unconstitutional. . . .It is clear, I think, that the
,operation of the amendment [to Civil Code § 1721 must be confined, at least, to com-
munity property acquired after its passage." 116 Cal. at 349, 48 Pac. at 231.
9 In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 197, 187 P.2d 722, 726 (1947); Grolemund v.
-Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 683, 111 P.2d 641, 643 (1941); Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191
Cal. 601, 605, 218 Pac. 22, 23 (1923); Palen v. Palen, 28 Cal. App. 2d 602, 604, 83
P.2d 36, 37 (1938).
10 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944). Justice Traynor stated in his concurring
1966]
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interests was based upon an unsound constitutional theory. Both the
Thornton and Spreckles cases have been the subject of considerable
adverse criticism"l which is summarized by the court in Addison.12
In this regard, it is important to note that Civil Code section 140.5
classifies as quasi-community property such separate property as has
been "heretofore or hereafter" acquired, and Civil Code section
146(a) substantially modifies the owner's rights therein at the time
of a divorce or separate maintenance decree. Since the property in
Addison was acquired by the husband prior to enactment of the
legislation, it would seem to follow that the quasi-community prop-
erty legislation must be "retroactive," in that it deprived the husband
of a prior "vested" interest in his property. However, the court in
Addison did not feel compelled to follow the Spreckles rule or the
constitutional theory laid down in Thornton. Referring to Thornton,
the Addison court stated: "But even if the rule of that case be ac-
cepted as sound, it is not here controlling .... The legislation under
discussion [Civil Code sections 140.5, 146] unlike old section 164,
makes no attempt to alter property rights merely upon crossing the
boundary into California. . . . Instead, the concept of quasi-com-
munity property is applicable only if a divorce or separate mainte-
nance action is filed here after the parties have become domiciled in
California... the concept is applicable only if... certain acts or
events occur which give rise to an action for divorce or separate
maintenance."'
By this rationale the court disposed of the husband's assertion that
the quasi-community property legislation was an abridgment of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause the legislation impinged upon his right to maintain a domicile
in any state of his choice without the loss of valuable property rights.
The court held that the legislation did not cause a loss of valuable
opinion: "[T]he decisions that existing statutes changing the rights of husbands and
wives in community property can have no retroactive application have become a rule of
property in this state and should not now be overruled. It is my opinion, however, that
the constitutional theory on which they are based is unsound .... That theory has not
become a rule of property and should not invalidate future legislation in this field in-
tended by the Legislature to operate retroactively." (Citations omitted.) 23 Cal. 2d at
623, 145 P.2d at 318.
11 Articles cited in Addison include the following: Armstrong, "Prospective" Ap-
plication of Charges in Community Property Control-Rule of Property or Constitu-
tional Necessity? 33 CALIF. L. REv. 476 (1945) ; Schreter, "Quas-Community Property"
in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 206 (1962); Comment, 27 CALIF. L. REv.
49, 51-55 (1938); Comment, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1927).
12 62 Cal. 2d at 565, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
'3 Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
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property rights merely through change of domicile; only when cer-
tain acts or events occurred, completely unconnected with a change of
domicile, which gave rise to an action for divorce or separate main-
tenance in California, would the legislation affect rights.14
The husband also contended that California, under the rule of
Spreckles, has refused to interfere with the vested property rights of
its own citizens and must therefore accord him the same treatment
under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2
of the United States Constitution. The court pointed out that the
privileges and immunities clause is not absolute and that rational
discrimination was not precluded where there is a valid reason for it,
independent of the fact that individuals affected are citizens of
another state. The court reasoned that since the wife had lost the
protection afforded her in her own state when she moved to Cali-
fornia she was in need of protection from California, hence "the
discrimination, if there be such, is reasonable and not of the type
article IV of the federal constitution seeks to enjoin."'15
In regard to the due process issue raised in Addison, the court held
that such a substantial interest on the part of the state exists upon
dissolution of the marriage relationship as to give the state the right
to interfere with vested property rights in order to protect the prop-
erty interests of domiciliaries and enforce marital responsibilities.
The court went on to state:
In the case at bar it was Leona who was granted a divorce from
Morton on the ground of the latter's adultery and hence it is the
spouse guilty of marital infidelity from whom the otherwise sepa-
rate property is sought by the operation of the quasi-community
property legislation. We are of the opinion that where the innocent
party would otherwise be left unprotected the state has a very sub-
stantial interest and one sufficient to provide for a fair and equitable
distribution of the marital property without running afoul of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the same
reasons sections 1 and 13 of article 1 of the California Constitution,
substantially similar in language, are not here applicable.'0
This rationale supports only the provisions of Civil Code section
146(a) since it would apply only where the property of an adulterous
spouse is being divided. Thus, the constitutionality of other provi-
sions of the quasi-community property legislation, such as Civil Code
14 Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
'5 Id. at 569, 399 P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
16 Id. at 567, 399 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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section 146(b) ,1  which distributes quasi-community property
equally when divorce decrees are based on other grounds, has yet to
be decided. However, in view of the underlying theme of Addison,
it would be surprising if future decisions hold the quasi-community
property legislation unconstitutional even where the relative fault of
the parties is not in issue.
Aside from distinguishing Thornton on the basis of the substantial
difference in the effect of former Civil Code section 164 and that of
the legislation under consideration in Addison, it is not clear from
the opinion why the Spreckles rule should not be controlling in
Addison. In the closing portion of the opinion, the court states: "Nor
is the statute being applied retroactively. That is so because the legis-
lation here involved neither creates nor alters rights except upon
divorce or separate maintenance. The judgment of divorce was
granted after the effective date of the legislation. Hence the statute
is being applied prospectively."' 8 There are several possible inter-
pretations of this rationale. One view is that it may have been in-
cluded in the opinion to further distinguish the legislation considered
in Thornton and Spreckles from the quasi-community property legis-
lation considered in Addison on the basis of applicability. If this
view is correct, it may then be inferred that the court in Addison is
announcing a different criterion for the determination of the pros-
pective or retroactive effect of legislation. But, if the court meant
that the statute was "prospective" in that it did not alter the vested
interest of the husband which had been acquired prior to enactment
of the legislation, the statement would seem to be inconsistent with
the rationale of the rest of the opinion, which is to the effect that
it is within the legislature's power to pass retroactive statutes and,
as applied in Addison, it is not unconstitutional to deprive the
husband of a prior vested property interest.
Another view regarding the Addison court's determination that
the legislation was being applied prospectively is that since the
divorce action had been filed prior to the effective date of legisla-
tion it can be assumed that the court was emphasizing that only the
divorce decree altered the rights of the parties while Civil Code
section 140.5 was merely definitional in its effect. Therefore, the
statute was being applied prospectively rather than retroactively in
this particular case, even though the effective date of the legislation
was after the filing of the cause of action.
17 See statute cited note 2 supra.
18 62 Cal. 2d at 569, 399 P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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By either view, the opinion seems to indicate that, although con-
stitutionally unsound, the rule in Spreckles is an established rule of
property as to cases previously decided under then existing com-
munity property legislation but that the Spreckles rule will not
necessarily govern the judicial determination of the constitutionality
of future community property legislation. 9
It is dear that Addison did not overrule the rule of property laid
down by Spreckles, Thornton, and successive decisions. Therefore,
the community property code sections construed by these decisions 0
should continue to have only "prospective" effect in that they affect
only interests in property acquired after the effective date of legis-
lation. However, Addison does attack the constitutional theory upon
which these cases were based, i.e., that the state cannot change or
interfere with vested property interests in community property with-
out abridging the citizen's privileges and immunities and violating
his right to due process of law. It is therefore concluded that future
legislation, even if it interferes with vested property rights, will be
found constitutional if it is determined that the state's interest is so
substantial as to warrant the interference and, that the intent of the
legislature is clear that the legislation should operate retroactively.2 '
Addison is the first case construing the quasi-community property
legislation, which is unique in community property law. The fact
that the legislature can modify the vested property interests of a
19 Id. at 565-66, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
20 The following community property statutes have been construed to have only
prospective application, i.e., are ineffectual as to property acquired prior to passage of
the legislation: CAL. Crv. CODE § 161a (enacted 1927), which defines the interests of
husband and wife in community property. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111
P.2d 641 (1941) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 Pac. 439 (1928). CAL. Civ.
CODE § 164 (1917 amendment), redefining community property. Estate of Frees, 187
Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921); Estate of Arms, 186 CaL. 554, 199 Pac. 1053 (1921).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 164 (1923 amendment), see statute cited note 6, supra. Estate of
Drishaus, 199 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515 (1926). CAL. CIV. CODE § 169.1 (enacted 1951),
which made earnings and accumulations separate property after judgement of divorce
or decree for separate maintenance. Jacquemart v. Jacquemart, 125 Cal. App. 2d 122,
269 P.2d 951 (1954). CAL. Crv. CODE § 169.2 (enacted 1959), which made earnings
and accumulations separate property after interlocutory judgement of divorce. Fritschi
v. Teed, 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1963). CAL. Civ. CODE § 172 (1891
amendment). Scott v. Austin, 58 Cal. App. 643, 209 Pac. 251 (1922); Sprecldes v.
Spreckles, 116 Cal. 343, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). CAL. CIrv. CODE § 172 (1917 amend-
ment), which limited the husband's management and control of community personal
property. Spreng v. Spreng, 119 Cal. App. 155, 6 P.2d 104 (1931). CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 172(a) (enacted 1917), which provided that a wife can set aside a husband's
gratuitous conveyance of community property in which she does not join. Stewart v.
Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197 (1926); Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218
Pac. 22 (1923). CAL. CiV. CODE § 1401 (1923 amendment, now CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 201), which is a succession statute. McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 Pac. 519
(1928).
21 62 Cal. 2d at 565, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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living spouse 22 by subsequent legislative enactments is an important
conceptual change in California community property law. The com-
mendable result of the decision in Addison is that, with respect to
the kinds of property described in Civil Code section 140.5, all
California domiciliaries, regardless of their origin, receive equal
treatment in judgments of divorce. At least one authority23 has sug-
gested that the California legislature should consider amending
section 140.5 to include real property located outside California as
a logical development of community property law which would fur-
ther equalize the treatment of all California domiciliaries.
DONALD E. STUDER
22 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 gives to the surviving spouse one half of all the per-
sonal property wherever situated and the real property located in California which
would not have been the separate property of the acquiring spouse had it been acquired
while domiciled in California. In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947), up-
held the constitutionality of § 201.5 on the theory that the state of domicile of the
decedent had full power to control rights of succession. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal.
2d at 564, 399 P.2d at 900, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 100, states: ".... no one has a vested right
to succeed to another's property rights, and no one has a vested right in the distribu-
tion of his estate upon his death. Hence succession rights may be constitutionally
altered."
23 "If the thesis is accepted that California may constitutionally reclassify property
brought into the state by persons who become domiciled there, then it follows that
California may reclassify property left behind." Schreter, supra note 9, at 238. However,
there may be serious conflict of laws problems involved, with which this case note does
not deal. See Marsh, A Study Relating to Inter Vivos Rights in Property Acquired by
Spouse While Domiciled Elsewhere, 3 CAL. L. REvisroN COmm'N, REIoa.rs RECOM -
MENDATIONS AND STUDIES I (1961).
